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COMMENT
HIV, AIDS & JOB DISCRIMINATION:
NORTH CAROLINA FAILURE AND
FEDERAL REDEMPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Last spring, Campbell University received bills totaling over
twenty thousand dollars for the medical treatment of one Camp-
bell physical education teacher who had missed five weeks of
work. Upon inquiry, Campbell officials found the source of the
teacher's problem - Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (here-
inafter "AIDS"). When the teacher returned to work, school offi-
cials told him to clean out his office and not return for any reason.
Yet, before the school discovered the illness, one school official
informed the teacher that his absence was no problem. Recover-
ing from pneumocystis carinii pneumonia during his absence, the
teacher sent lesson plans and prepared tests for his students.
Before the incident, he consistently earned solid performance rat-
ings. Campbell University relieved the teacher of his duties solely
because he had AIDS.'
The teacher contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter "EEOC"). On April 25, 1994, the EEOC
filed a law suit against Campbell University for violating the
Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA").2 This law-
1. The above are only alleged facts in the EEOC's federal suit against
Campbell University as reported in Donna Seese, Teacher with AIDS Sues
Campbell University, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, Apr. 28, 1994, at A3 and Campbell
Defends Decision to Ban Teacher with AIDS, DAILY IEFLECTOR, Apr. 29, 1994, at
Al. Subsequently, attorneys for the teacher asked the U.S. District Court in
Raleigh to seal all court documents to protect the teacher's identity. As of this
writing, the court documents are unavaliable to the general public. It should be
noted that it is not the author's intention to determine the liability of any party
concerned in this pending case. Any reference to this case is solely in the context
of an introduction to HIV/AIDS related job discrimination law in North Carolina.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 and 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Supp. II 1990).
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suit is North Carolina's first AIDS related job discrimination case
under the ADA.3 Yet, such lawsuits are not uncommon elsewhere,
and victims of AIDS related job discrimination are seeing results:
Chicago: Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. fired a clerk three
months after he confided to his immediate supervisor that he had
AIDS.4 The clerk was among. the first AIDS patients in the coun-
try to file under the ADA.5 After losing a motion for summary
judgment,6 the mortgage company agreed to pay the clerk
$160,000 in damages and back pay and reinstated the clerk as
well.7
Philadelphia: William Shapiro, Esq. P.C. fired one of its law-
yers without notice or severance pay eight days after the lawyer
told fellow attorney William Shapiro that he had AIDS.' The law-
yer sued under the ADA, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,
and the Pennsylvania common law for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Shapiro firm filed a motion to dismiss in
federal court. District Judge Gawthrop denied the law firm's
motion as to all of the lawyer's claims except intentional infliction
of emotional distress.9 Less than one month later, the Shapiro
law firm settled the case on undisclosed terms. Said the prevail-
ing lawyer, "I'm satisfied."10
The preliminary results are optimistic for people who are vic-
tims of AIDS related job discrimination. But as North Carolina
approaches its first AIDS employment discrimination case under
the new federal act, it is important to note the development of
AIDS related discrimination law in North Carolina. In the past,
the results illustrated above were not always possible. In 1989,
the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Epidemic (hereinafter "Presidential Commission") urged for
legislative change, when it stated:
3. Seese, supra note 1, at A3.
4. Matt O'Connor, An AIDS Patient Wins Back His Job, Settlement Will Also
Pay Him $160,000, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1994, at Al.
5. Id.
6. Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage Co., Inc., No. 94 C 139, 1994 WL 440662
(N.D. Ill. June 10, 1994).
7. O'Connor, supra note 4, at Al.
8. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Settlement Reached in AIDS Suit, the Unidentified
Lawyer Alleged He Was Fired After Disclosing His Illness, PHILADELPHIA
INQUMER, May 14, 1994, at B2.
9. Doe v. William Shapiro, Esquire, P.C., 852 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
10. Slobodzian, supra note 8, at B2.
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As long as discrimination occurs, and no strong national policy
with rapid and effective remedies against discrimination is estab-
lished, individuals who are affected with HIV will be reluctant to
come forward for testing, counseling and care. This fear of poten-
tial discrimination... will undermine our efforts to contain the
HIV epidemic, and will leave HIV-infected individuals isolated
and alone.1 '
As the Presidential Commission pushed for a "national" pol-
icy, North Carolina government reinforced the need for such
sweeping federal legislation. In fact, before the ADA, the Camp-
bell teacher relieved of his duties arguably would have had no
cause of action under North Carolina law. For example, the North
Carolina Supreme Court declined to apply the state's Handi-
capped Persons Protection Act to persons infected with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (hereinafter "HIV"). 12 The court
reached this result despite the fact that the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly patterned its law after a federal law which federal
courts interpreted as applying to HIV infected persons. Also, the
North Carolina General Assembly attempted to address the issue
of AIDS discrimination by adding employment provisions to its
Communicable Disease Act.i" The legislature, instead, provided a
license to employers to discriminate based on HIV or AIDS. These
shortcomings, in part, forced the advent of a national policy. Yet,
it was not until 1992, when the ADA became effective, that North
Carolina citizens were provided with a significant weapon against
AIDS related job discrimination.
This Comment explores the origin and effect of the ADA on
AIDS related discrimination law in North Carolina. First, the
Comment provides an overview of the disease, the discrimination
behind it, and the past efforts to confront the problem. In particu-
lar, the Comment details how the federal government and most
states moved to respond to AIDS discrimination and how simulta-
neously North Carolina's government stripped most victims of
AIDS discrimination of their day in court. The Comment then
describes the ADA, its application to AIDS discrimination, and
11. S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989), reprinted in Laura R.
Gasarch, Discrimination Against the Disabled, AIDS AND THE LAw 199, 209
(Wiley Law Publications Editorial Staff eds., 2d ed. 1992).
12. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134
(1990). See also infra text accompanying notes 74-97.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148 (1992). See infra text accompanying notes
98-110.
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how the ADA contrasts with North Carolina's response to AIDS
discrimination.
II. OVERVIEW
A. The Problem
AIDS is a specific group of diseases or conditions which are
indicative of severe immunosuppression related to infection with
HIV.1 4 The condition arises from HIV's attack on one type of
white blood cell, the T-cell.' 5 These cells contribute in two ways to
the body's immune defenses: regulatory T-cells work with B-cells
(another type of white blood cell) to produce particular antibodies,
while cytotoxic T-cells directly attack body cells either already
infected by viruses or malignant due to cancer. 16 One of the regu-
latory T-cells, the helper T-cells, aid in activating B-cells, T-cells,
and other disease-fighting cells. HIV attaches to a protein on the
helper T-cells, causing the helper T-cells to die.' 7
In its most extreme manifestation, the gradual elimination of
helper T-cells leads to an irreversible immunodeficiency state. 18
The body, therefore, becomes open to many rare cancers and
opportunistic diseases, i.e., Kaposi's sarcoma and pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia.' 9 Not all HIV-infected individuals, however,
exhibit this extreme state, but suffer from a range of symptoms.
On the other hand, one can have HIV yet show no outward signs
of infection.20 This condition is commonly referred to as asymp-
tomatic HIV infection. Generally AIDS is diagnosed (rather than
HIV infection) upon the appearance of specific clinical conditions
14. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION [hereinafter "CDCP"I, 5
HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP. No. 4, at cover (1994).
15. Garry G. Mathiason & Steven B. Berlin, AIDS in the Healthcare,
Business, and Governmental Workplace, C902 ALL.I.-A.B.A. 731, 735 (1994).
16. Abe M. Macher, HIV Disease /AIDS: Medical Background, AIDS AND THE
LAw 1, 3-4 (Wiley Law Publications Editorial Staff eds., 2d ed. 1992 & Supp.
1994).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Mathiason & Berlin, supra note 15, at 736.
20. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal.
1987). For a more detailed discussion, see also Macher, supra note 16, at 7. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [hereinafter "CDC"] classify those
with HIV-infection into four groups: "(I) early acute, though transient, signs of
the disease; (II) asymptomatic infection; (III) persistent swollen lymph-nodes;
and (IV) presence of opportunistic disease and/or rare types of cancer." Thomas,
662 F. Supp. at 379.
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listed by the CDC, including two of the more frequent manifesta-
tions of HIV infection - Kaposi's sarcoma (a rare skin cancer) and
pneumocystis carinii pneumonia. 21 Researchers know neither the
percentage of those with HIV infection who will develop "full
blown" AIDS nor the length of time before HIV infection develops
into AIDS.22
Evidence shows that HIV transmission occurs only "(1)
through intimate sexual contact with an infected person; (2)
through invasive exposure to contaminated blood or certain other
bodily fluids; or (3) through preinatal [sic] exposure (i.e., from
mother to infant)."23 On the contrary, there is no evidence that
HIV transmission occurs through "casual workplace contact," such
as shaking hands, hugging, or even kissing on the cheek or lips.2
For example, out of an estimated health-care workforce of over
five and a half million,2 5 only forty health-care workers actually
became infected with HIV on the job.21 In contrast to its devas-
tating effects, the virus itself is fragile and killed by most ordinary
disinfectants.2 7
Despite the difficulties present in HIV transmission, the
reported number of HIV infections and AIDS cases continues to
rise. As of December 31, 1993, the CDC reports 361,164 cases of
AIDS in the United States and its territories.28 North Carolina
reported over four thousand of those cases.29 Additionally, North
Carolina reports that over four thousand cases of HIV infection
(not AIDS) have been identified since the state began HIV infec-
tion reporting in Febuary 1990.30 This number, however, repre-
sents only the minimum number of HIV-infected persons in North
Carolina.3 1  Estimates purport that between 650,000 and
1,400,000 Americans are HIV infected.12 In fact, the CDC projects
21. Macher, supra note 16, at 8-9.
22. Mathiason & Berlin, supra note 15, at 736.
23. Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988).
24. Mathiason & Berlin, supra note 15, at 737.
25. Id. at 737.
26. CDCP, supra note 14, at 19. Note, however, that eighty-three cases of
HIV transmission may have occurred on the job. Id.
27. Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 380.
28. CDCP, supra note 14, at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 21.
31. Id. at 31.
32. Christyno L. Hayes, Note, Rights of HIV-Infected Employees and Job
Applicants Under North Carolina Law: Lots of Legislative Activity, But Just How
1995]
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that in the United States, between 130,000 and 205,000 people
will suffer severe immunosuppression by January 1995.2
New legal problems arise with these statistics. As the late
Randy Shilts describes:
Suddenly there were children with AIDS who wanted to go to
school, laborers with AIDS who wanted to work, and researchers
who wanted funding, and there was a threat to the nation's public
health that, could no longer be ignored. Most significantly, there
were the first glimmers of awareness that the future would always
contain this strange new word.s4
Shilts saw that the incredible number of people with AIDS
presents a uniquely modern dilemma.
First, there exists the timeless challenge of facing "the
unknown." As with diseases of the past when unfamiliar - leprosy,
polio, epilepsy, cancer- fear of contagiousness leads to the isolation
of the sick. This fear does not end until there is an understanding
of how to transmit and prevent the disease.3 5 Second, because the
AIDS epidemic first struck the "fringe" elements of our society
through behavior many Americans consider repugnant, many
treat a public health crisis as a moral crisis. In the process of
rejecting the behavior, many ignore the disease. As one author
explains:
[A]n innate fear persists not just of the disease, but of the stigma,
surrounding AIDS and those suffering from it. Even though AIDS
is today recognized as a threat to the general public, people still
associate the disease with gays and intravenous drug abusers.
There is no question that many of the problems .. .reflect the
anatagonism toward these groups.3 6
Much Protection Does It Afford?, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 1193, 1193-94 (1990) (citing
Estimates ofHIV Prevalence and Projected AIDS Cases: Summary of a Workshop,
October 31-November 1, 1989, 39 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 110,
111 (1990)).
33. Macher, supra note 16, at 12 (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, Projections of the Number of Persons Diagnosed with AIDS and the
Number of Immunosuppressed HIV-Infected Persons - United States, 1992-4, 41
MoRBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., No. RR-18, at 1-2 (1992)).
34. RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: PoIrics, PEOPLE, AND THE
AIDS EPIDEMIC at xxi (Penguin Books 1988) (1987).
35. See 136 Cong. Rec. S9527-02, S9532 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (statement of
Sen. Hatch). See also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284-
85 (1987).
36. Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., AIDS and the Law, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 1993, at 8,
120 [Vol. 17:115
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Finally, the AIDS epidemic creates the challenge of controlling an
epidemic that spreads predominantly through sources generally
considered inappropriate topics for public discussion - sex and
drugs.
The challenge of breaking through these barriers failed dur-
ing the early years of the epidemic."7 The disease continues to
spread today and fear remains. Often, fear translates into unwar-
ranted exclusion of individuals with either HIV infection or AIDS
from the mainstream of society. Government, both state and fed-
eral, found that its role was not only to control the disease, but
also remedy the social injustice it bore.
B. Early Responses to AIDS Discrimination
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Before the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (hereinafter
"RA") provided the most significant protection for victims of AIDS
related discrimination.3 8 The protection offered by the RA, how-
ever, extended only to programs or activities receiving federal
financial assistance or programs or activities conducted by an
executive agency or the United States Postal Service. 9 Yet,
within this narrow scope, AIDS discrimination sufferers found
their first victories. More important, the RA's language and sub-
sequent case law formed the foundations of both the ADA and
North Carolina's legislation for the disabled.40
At its core, the RA states that no otherwise "qualified handi-
capped person " 4 1 can "be excluded from the participation in, be
37. See generally SmLTs, supra note 34.
38. David W. Webber, AIDS in the Workplace, AIDS AND mE LAw 45, 73
(Wiley Law Publications Editorial Staff eds., 2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994). Note
that the Employee Retirement income Security Act [hereinafter "ERISA"] and
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [hereinafter
"COBRA"] may provide additional federal protection. See Angela S. Bullard,
North Carolina's New AIDS Discrimination Protection: Who Do They Think
They're Fooling?, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 475, 488-91 (1990).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (stating that "the
standards used to determine whether section [794(a)] has been violated in a
complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the
standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.");
Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 212, 388 S.E.2d 134, 138
(1990) (stating the state handicap act was patterned after the federal RA).
41. As 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1993) provides, a "Qualified handicapped
person" with respect to employment, means "a handicapped person who, with
1995]
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denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination" under
any federally funded program "solely by reason of her or his disa-
bility."42 The RA covers "any person who (i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major
life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment."4 3 Enforcement of the
RA duplicates the procedures and remedies of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.44
The RA's statutory language never refers specifically to AIDS,
or any contagious disease in general, as a protected handicap.
Although many commentators disagreed as to the inclusion of
AIDS as a handicap,45 the United States Supreme Court essen-
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in
question." Id. In 1992, Congress changed the language of the RA to conform to
the ADA's terminology. Thus, "qualified handicapped person" is now "qualified
individual with a disability."
42. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
43. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k). The regulations define "Physical or mental
impairment" as:
[Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory,
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or any
mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(i) (1993). "Major life activities" is defined as "functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id. Both the North Carolina
Handicapped Persons Protection Act [hereinafter "NCHPPA7] and the ADA are
patterned after this language.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988). After exhausting administrative remedies, an
injured party may file a complaint with the EEOC. If, after an investigation,
reasonable cause is found and the EEOC can reach no informal conciliation with
the employer, the EEOC refers the matter to the Attorney General, who may
either file a civil action against the head of the violating federal agency or
program or allow the injured party to file such an action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f-k) (1988).
45. In fact, the Department of Justice during the Reagan Administration
concluded in one memorandum that the RA is applicable to discrimination
stemming from the "disabling effects of AIDS," but not an "individual's real or
perceived ability to transmit the disease." See Gasarch, supra note 11, at 199,
209 (discussing a memorandum from Charles C. Cooper, assistant attorney
general, Office of Legal Counsel, to Robert E. Robertson, general counsel,
Department of Health and Human Services (June 6, 1986)).
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tially resolved the debate with its opinion in School Board of Nas-
sau County v. Arline.a6 Although the case did not address AIDS
specifically, a7 the Court confronted discrimination based on
another contagious disease. In Arline, a local school board dis-
charged an elementary school teacher who had suffered a third
relapse of tuberculosis within two years.48 Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the majority, maintained that allowing discrimination
solely because a physical impairment may be contagious was
inconsistent with the purposes of the RA. Justice Brennan
opined:
Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of public fear
and misapprehension as contagiousness. Even those who suffer or
have recovered from such noninfectious diseases as epilepsy or
cancer have faced discrimination based on the irrational fear that
they might be contagious. The [RA] is carefully structured to
replace such reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps
with actions based on reasoned and medically sound judgments
.... The fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may
pose a serious health threat to others under certain circumstances
does not justify excluding from the coverage of the Act all persons
with actual or perceived contagious diseases. Such exclusion
would mean that those accused of being contagious would never
have the opportunity to have their condition evaluated in light of
medical evidence and a determination made as to whether they
were "otherwise qualified." Rather, they would be vulnerable to
discrimination on the basis of mythology-precisely the type of
injury Congress sought to prevent.49
The Court concluded that a contagious disease may constitute a
"handicap" under the RA.
The Court then held that in finding whether the dangers of
transmission outweigh the disabled individual's right to a job, a
court should consider "(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease
is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier
infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm
to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be trans-
mitted and will cause varying degrees of harm."50 The RA only
46. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
47. See id. at 282 n.7.
48. Id. at 276.
49. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284-85.
50. Id. at 288. The Court adopted the position espoused in the American
Medical Association's amicus curiae. See Brief for American Medical Association
as Amicus Curiae at 19, Arline (No. 85-1277).
1995]
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requires exclusion of the employee where there is a "significant
risk of communicating an infectious disease to others."5 1 The
Court remanded the case to the District Court to conclude
whether the fired employee was "otherwise qualified" to serve as a
teacher, and thus protected under the RA.52
In subsequent federal litigation, as AIDS was incorporated
into the scope of the RA, the notion that exclusion should be based
only on medically sound judgment remained central to courts'
analyses of the issues. For example, in California, a local Depart-
ment of Education reassigned a teacher of hearing-impaired stu-
dents to an administrative position and barred him from teaching
in the classroom after learning the teacher was diagnosed with
AIDS.53 The teacher filed an action under the RA, asking first for
a preliminary injunction to gain reinstatement. The trial court
denied the preliminary injunction because it was not "completely
certain" that transmission could not occur in the typical classroom
environment and the fear of the children, which the teacher's
presence in the classroom would produce, outweighed any injury
to the teacher.5 4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, using the analysis outlined in
Arline, held that AIDS is a handicap under the RA.55 In showing
that a fired employee is "otherwise qualified" for a position apart
from a disability, the court held that the claimant need not dis-
prove "every theoretical possibility of harm."56 The RA only
51. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16.
52. Id. at 288-89. On remand, the district court held that the teacher was
"otherwise qualified" when she was discharged, and therefore, she was entitled to
reinstatement and back pay. See Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 692 F.
Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla. 1988). Subsequently, the RA was amended to include
language based on the Arline decision. The language included, in pertinent part,
reads:
(C) For the purpose of sections 793 and 794 of this title, as such sections
relate to employment, such term does not include an individual who has
a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such
disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious
disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of the job.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C) (1988). See Bullard, supra note 38, at 486-87.
53. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 703.
54. Id. at 707, 711.
55. The court essentially assumed that AIDS was a "handicap," and moved
directly from an outline of the Arline decision to the "otherwise qualified"
analysis. Id. at 705:
56. Id. at 707-09.
124 [Vol. 17:115
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requires exclusion if there is a significant risk of harm. 7 As in
Arline, the court concluded that while "[1]ittle in science can be
proved with complete certainty, [courts should rely on] reasonable
medical judgements [before] speculation ... with no credible sup-
port in the record."" Similarly, the court held that the fears of
parents and students are not grounds for denial of a preliminary
injunction; the district court should monitor a case, "guided by
qualified medical opinion" to ensure safety to the community. 59
The court remanded the case to the district court with direction to
grant the preliminary injuction.60
Requiring action based only on "medically sound judgment,"
however, does not guarantee that no one can ever exclude a person
with AIDS from certain tasks. In fact, many courts are reluctant
to' find health-care workers with AIDS "otherwise qualified" for
health care employment. For example, a surgical technologist is
not "otherwise qualified" due to the "cognizable risk of permanent
duration with lethalconsequences."6 1 The technologist placed his
hands in a body cavity at least once a day, and had accidents with
sharp surgical instruments in the past. 2 In another case, an
employer transferrred a HIV-positive firefighter to light duty after
learning of his HIV status.63 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
exclusion from active duty in part because although "the belief of
posing a risk through rescue duties was erroneously held" by two
57. Id. at 708 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.16).
58. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 708.
59. Id. at 711.
60. Id. at 712. Courts consistently apply this analysis to the opposite side of
the classroom - where the student has AIDS. In fact, a California federal district
court granted a preliminary injunction allowing a child with AIDS to attend
regular kindergarten classes before the Supreme Court announced the Arline
opinion. The court found that the child was "otherwise qualified" for class
enrollment, although in one incident the child "got into a skirmish" and bit a
fellow student. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D.
Cal. 1987). In post-Arline decisions, courts addressing the inclusion of children
with AIDS into integrated classroom settings have reached similar results. See
Martinez v. School Bd. of Hillsborough Co., 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988); Ray
v. School Dist. of DeSoto Co., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla 1987).
61. Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924
(5th Cir. 1993). See also Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909
F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (licensed practical nurse who refused to submit HIV test
results was not "otherwise qualified" for position).
62. Bradley, 3 F.3d at 924.
63. Severino v. North Ft. Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir.
1991).
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doctors consulted prior to the firefighter's transfer, the defendants
relied upon this "reasonable medical opinion." 4
Generally persons infected with HIV do not pose a direct
threat to the safety of others.65 The RA and its case law illustrate
that AIDS and HIV infection is a "disability," which should not
alone disqualify a person from employment. In sum, the question
is really whether the person can otherwise operate in the environ-
ment without creating an undue risk of injury to others. Specifi-
cally, this hurdle must be crossed before liability can extend to the
employer. Finding the answer to this question falls upon science,
not the layman's preconceived notions of contagiousness.
2. States
As with the resolution of many issues, states differ in
approach.66 Most states have responded to AIDS discrimination
by expanding the rights of the individual excluded from general
employment, either by interpreting an existing handicap anti-dis-
crimination statute as including AIDS or HIV infection 7 or
adding specific AIDS anti-discrimination language .6  An expan-
64. Id. at 1182. See also Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
Alabama prison officials segregated inmates with AIDS from the general prison
population. The trial court concluded that the prisoners were not "otherwise
qualified" due to the homosexual activity, intravenous drug use, and tattooing
pervasive in a prison environment. See Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564
(M.D. Ala. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for a determination of
the prisoners' qualifications regarding each program, not simply regarding the
general population.
65. Hancock, supra note 36, at 8.
66. See generally Mathiason & Berlin, supra note 15, at 748-49; Webber,
supra note 38, at 99-103.
67. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (AIDS is a handicap
under Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.); Raytheon Co. v. California Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (AIDS is a
physical handicap under Fair Employment Practices Act.); Sanchez v.
Lagoudakis, 486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992) (AIDS is a handicap under Michigan
Handicapper's Civil Rights Act.); Petri v. Bank of New York Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d
608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (Asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability under the
New York Human Rights Law.); Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.,
390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990) (AIDS is a handicap under West Virginia Human
Rights Act.); Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 476
N.W.2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (Asymptomatic HIV infection is handicapped
under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.).
68. See ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19204-B (West 1989 & Supp. 1993)
(AIDS test prohibited as a condition of employment.); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 111,
§ 70F (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994) (same); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-6-22 (1988 & Supp.
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sion of a victim's rights, however, is not absolute. For example,
Georgia and Kentucky expressly exclude those with communica-
ble disease from protection under their respective disability acts.69
Additionally, in Missouri, a clerk complained to the Missouri Com-
mission on Human Rights when his employer moved him from his
duties as sandwich maker after it was rumored he had AIDS.70
The statute defined "handicap" as "a physical or mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major
life activities, or a condition perceived as such."7 ' The court held
that the employee had "no 'condition' to be 'perceived.' . . . The
statute requires the existence of a condition which might be per-
ceived to be a handicap."72 Although most states respond to AIDS
related job discrimination by expanding victims' rights, examples
such as these added fire to the argument for a national policy.73
C. North Carolina's Handling of AIDS Discrimination
As the following illustrates, the importance now attached to
the ADA stems in part from North Carolina's failure to provide a
comprehensive cause-of-action for victims of AIDS related
discrimination.
1. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh
In 1985, the North Carolina General Assembly expanded the
rights of disabled individuals with legislation patterned after the
federal RA. 7 The North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protec-
tion Act (hereinafter "NCHPPA) 7 5 prohibits "[a]n employer to fail
to hire or consider for employment or promotion, to discharge, or
1993) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1993) (same); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.172 (West 1990) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.15 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1993) (same).
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3(b) (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.140(2)(c)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
70. Rose City Oil Co. v. Commission on Human Rights, 832 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992).
71. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 213.010(8) (1986).
72. Rose City Oil Co., 832 S.W.2d at 317. Compare with Hilton v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 936 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting a Texas act
as excluding AIDS, for the examples of impairments listed in the statute's
definition of handicap were all "physiological rather than pathological condition
of physical health").
73. See Webber, supra note 38, at 45, 99.
74. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168A-1 to 168A-12 (1987).
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otherwise to discriminate against a qualified handicapped person
on the basis of a handicapping condition with respect to compen-
sation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."76
Like the RA, a "Handicapped person" is "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment;
or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."77 Yet, while
the North Carolina legislature patterned the statute's language
after the RA, North Carolina's courts chose to ignore the federal
act's case law concerning AIDS related discrimination.
In Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc. ,78 the North.Caro-
lina Supreme Court held the state handicap act does not apply to
one infected with HIV who is otherwise asymptomatic. In the
case, the defendant, Your House of Raleigh restaurant, employed
plaintiff, Scott Burgess, as a short-order cook until learning that
he was HIV-positive. Based solely on this information, the
defendant fired the plaintiff.79 Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging
his discharge violated the anti-discrimination language in the
NCHPPA. The superior court, however, dismissed the suit, con-
cluding that plaintiff was not a "handicapped person" as defined
by the state handicap act.8 0 The North Carolina Supreme Court
granted discretionary review before a determination by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals."1 Plaintiff primarily argued that the
court should, like other federal and state courts, recognize that an
asymptomatic HIV infected individual has a physical impairment
which limits major life activities and thus falls within the stat-
ute's definition of a "handicapped person." 2 Mentioning "little
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-5(a) (1987).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(4) (1987). The NCHPPA patterns its definitions
of "physical or mental impairment" and "major life activity" after the RA. One
difference between the NCHPPA and the RA is the absence of "working" as a
"major life activity." See supra note 43.
78. 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
79. Id. at 207, 388 S.E.2d at 135.
80. Id. at 208, 388 S.E.2d at 136.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 208, 388 S.E.2d at 136. See Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 17-
19, Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990)
(No. 235PA89), citing Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.
1988); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal.
1987); Ray v. School Bd. of Desoto Co., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Doe v.
Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Raytheon Co. v.
Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Cronan v.
New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1273.
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uniformity" and "minimal case law," however, the court found the
case law from other states "of little value." 3 The court then dis-
tinguished the federal and state acts, despite conceding that their
definitions of "handicapped person" and "qualified handicapped
person" were "virtually identical.""4
The court agreed that HIV infection is a "physical impair-
ment" under the state act,8 5 but unlike federal case law refused to
recognize it as one which "limits a major life activity."86 Plaintiff
maintained that the termination from employment was itself a
limitation of a "major life activity."7 The court noted that unlike
the federal act, the state act does not list "working" as a major life
activity. 8 The absence of the word "working" led the court to con-
clude that "the General Assembly intended the [NCHPPA] to be
more narrow in scope than its federal counterpart."8 9 As an
asymptomatic carrier of HIV, the plaintiff did not Show any other
condition which actually limited any specifically listed "major life
activity."90 Plaintiff also argued that limitations on child rearing
and intimate relations constitute limitations on "major life activi-
ties."9 ' Yet, the court concluded these activities are not within the
scope of "major life activities" as evidenced by the listed activities,
"that is, essential tasks one must perform on a regular basis in
order to carry on a normal existence."92 The plaintiff, therefore,
83. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 211, 388 S.E.2d at 138.
84. Id.
85. HIV infection, plaintiff contended, fell within the statute definition of a
"physical impairment" due to HIV's toll on the hemic and lymphatic systems, as
well as the substantial limits HIV infection places on the ability to conceive and
bear healthy children. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 12-13, Burgess (No.
235PA89).
86. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 213, 388 S.E.2d at 138.
87. Id.
88. Id. Plaintiff argued that the list is illustrative, not exhaustive. Plaintiff-
Appellant's New Brief at 11-12, Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C.
205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990) (No. 235PA89) ("The statute defines 'major life
activities' as 'functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,[etc.].. ).
89. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 213-14, 388 S.E.2d at 139. The court added that
nonetheless plaintiff's usual "working" duties were not actually impaired by his
HIV infection. Id.
90. Id
91. Id. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139.
92. Id.
1995] 129
15
McKinney: HIV, AIDS & Job Discrimination: North Carolina Failure and Federa
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
failed to show that asymptomatic HIV infection limits a "major life
activity."93
The court also distinguished the state handicap act from the
federal RA based on the inclusion of a communicable disease
exemption in the state act. Unlike its federal counterpart, the
state handicap act states that "[i]t is not a discriminatory action
for an employer . . . [t]o fail to hire, transfer, or promote, or to
discharge a handicapped person because the person has a commu-
nicable disease which would disqualify a non-handicapped person
from similar employment."9 4 The court reasoned that the "person
suffering from the communicable disease must have an additional
disability which qualifies as a handicap."9 5 "Carrying this analy-
sis one step further," the court stated:
If one removes the words "communicable disease" in the provision
and replaces them with the word "handicap," so that the exemp-
tion reads, "[i]t is not a discriminatory action for an employer...
to discharge a handicapped person because the person has a
[handicap] which would disqualify a non-handicapped person from
similar employment," the provision would make no sense, because
one cannot, by definition, simultaneously be both handicapped
and non-handicapped.96
The plaintiff, of course, had shown no additional disability and
thus liability could not arise under the Act.97 The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case. Victims of AIDS
related discrimination would have to now turn to the North Caro-
lina General Assembly.
93. Id. The court, in cursory fashion, also stated that plaintiff failed to show
that he is regarded as having such an impairment. Id. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139-
40. Plaintiff maintained that the "perception of others renders him a
'handicapped person' within the meaning of the [NCHPPA] ... ." Plaintiff-
Appellant's New Brief at 13, Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C.
205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990) (No. 235PA89).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-5(b)(3) (1987).
95. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 215, 388 S.E.2d at 140.
96. Id. at 216, 388 S.E.2d at 140-41.
97. The court also found that the legislature did not intend to cover HIV
infection when it passed the NCHPPA, for House anti-AIDS discrimination
language as well as a Senate subcommittee amendment repealing the
communicable disease exemption were both absent from the final version of the
bill. Id. at 216-17, 388 S.E.2d at 141. In addition, the General Assembly
subsequently passed a Communicable Disease Act. Id.
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2. The North Carolina Communicable Disease Act (NCCDA)
Contributing to the defeat of the plaintiff's claim in Burgess v.
Your House of Raleigh, Inc. " was the fact that the North Carolina
General Assembly recently had rewritten the North Carolina
Communicable Disease Act (hereinafter "NCCDA"), adding
"AIDS-specific anti-discrimination provisions."99 While the legis-
lation does address both AIDS testing and discrimination, the
General Assembly riddled the statute with so many exceptions
that any utility it might have possessed largely has disappeared.
Generally, the added language provides that no AIDS test can be
"required, performed or used to determine suitability for contin-
ued employment," nor may any employer discriminate against any
person with AIDS or HIV infection "on account of that infection in
determining suitability for continued employment." 10 0 Upon vio-
lation, the injured person may file a civil action' 01 1 in superior
court where the alleged injury occurred or where either party
resides. 102
The new language, however, creates a dichotomy between the
job applicant and the existing employee. While the NCCDA pro-
hibits testing as a prerequisite for continued employment, any
employer may require an AIDS test for job applicants in required
pre-employment medical examinations. 10 3 Employers cannot dis-
criminate against an existing employee with AIDS, but can deny
employment "based solely on a confirmed positive test for AIDS
virus infection." 10 4 Further, the NCCDA does not entirely insu-
late existing employees. An employer can include a test for AIDS
infection as part of an annual required medical examination rou-
tinely required of all employees, and take "appropriate" action,
including reassignment or termination, if continued employment
"would pose a significant risk to the health of the employee,
98. 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
99. Id. at 216, 388 S.E.2d at 141. The court in Burgess used the passage of
the bill to bolster their claim that the General Assembly did not intend
asymptomatic HIV infection to qualify as a "handicap" under the NCHPPA.
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i) (1992).
101. The court possesses the power to award declaratory and injunctive relief,
as well as back pay and reasonable attorney's fees. Id. The injured party must
file the action within one hundred eighty days "after the date on which the
aggrieved person became aware or, with reasonable diligence, should have
become aware of the alleged discriminatory practice or prohibited conduct." Id.
102. Id.
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i)(1)(1992).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i)(2)(1992).
1995]
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coworkers, or the public, or if the employee is unable to perform
the normally assigned duties of the job.""°5
Thus, as the United States entered the nineties, the federal
government and many states had taken great strides in the fight
against AIDS related discrimination. In contrast, by 1990 North
Carolina courts had denied victims of AIDS discrimination a
cause-of-action under the state's handicap protection act, and the
legislature had added "anti-discriminatory" measures that
authorized discrimination if the person with HIV/AIDS was an
applicant rather than an employee. Recognizing that in some
jurisdictions, state law was not responding sufficiently to discrimi-
nation against the disabled,"0 6 in 1990 Congress passed the
ADA. 107 Like the federal RA, the ADA incorporates the enforce-
ment provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, giving the EEOC
the power to hear complaints and sue personally or give the
injured party a "right-to-sue." 08 But' unlike the RA, which
applied only to federally funded programs, the ADA touches most
private employers, as well as employment agencies, labor organi-
zations, and joint labor-management committees. 10 9 The ADA
became effective July 26, 1992, and applied to employers with
twenty-five or more employees. As of July 26, 1994, the ADA
applies to employers with'fifteen or more employees." 0
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Act and Its General Application to HIVAIDS
1. The Scope of Discriminatory Behavior Prohibited under
the ADA
a. The General Provisions
The type of behavior classified as discrimination falls into sev-
eral broad areas within employer-employee relations. Generally,
Title I of the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating
against a "qualified individual with a disability" based on that dis-
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i)(3-4)(1992).
106. Webber, supra note 38, at 99 (citing H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 47 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 329).
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 and 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Supp. II 1990).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). The ADA does not apply to the federal government,
a federal government corporation, Indian tribes, or "a bona fide private
membership club" exempt from taxation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
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ability "in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment.""' Particularly, section 12112(b) of 42 U.S.C. provides:
An employer cannot (1) limit, segregate, or classify an applicant or
existing employee adversely based on the person's disability; (2)
administer the business in such a fashion that the administration
discriminates against those with disabilities or perpetuates
existing discrimination; (3) deny a job or position to an applicant
or exisitng employee based on the person's disability or another's
disability "with whom the qualified individual is known to have a
relationship or association"; or (4) maintain a criteria or test
which "screens out" persons with disabilities unless out of busi-
ness necessity." 2
Additionally, the ADA expands the scope of discriminatory
conduct to include a "reasonable accommodation" standard. A
"qualified individual with a disability" protected under the ADA is
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires. " "'
Although the ADA does not specifically define "reasonable accom-
modation," it states that the term includes making existing facili-
ties "accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, or
restructuring the job, making modified work schedules, or reas-
signing the employee." 114 An employer must make reasonable
accommodations to disabled employees or applicants, unless the
employer can show that any accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on business operation."' An employer also can-
not deny employment because such employment would require
some reasonable accommodations."16
The ADA addresses medical examinations and medical
inquiries. Generally, an employer may not require a medical
examination until after offering employment." 7 The required
medical examination itself should not be concerned with the exist-
ence or severity of a disability, unless "job-related and consistent
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2-3).
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with business necessity."118 The results of the examination may
be a condition of employment only if medical examinations are
required for all entering employees and the results are kept confi-
dential. 1 9 Of course, an employer may not use the results of the
examination in a discriminatory fashion. 20 Similarly, an
employer cannot make inquiries concerning the existence of a dis-
ability unless the inquiry concerns the ability of the applicant to
"perform job-related functions."' 2 '
b. Application to HIVIAIDS Employment Discrimination
The ADA retains the RA's definition of a "disability.1 22 Like
the RA, the ADA expressly includes neither HIV infection nor
AIDS. Congress, however, practically assumed that HIV and
AIDS were "disabilities." 23 In fact, the relationship between the
RA and the ADA implies the two should be read as consistent with
one another.1 24 A recent ADA case, Doe v. Kohn, Nast, & Graf,'25
addressed the issue directly.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). "A covered entity may conduct voluntary
medical examinations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part of
an employee health program available to employees at that work site." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(4)(B).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A), (B).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(C).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B)
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." Id.
123. "Congressman Owens of New York: People with HIV disease are
individuals who have any condition along the full spectrum of HIV infection-
asymptomatic HIV infection, symptomatic HIV infection or full blown AIDS.
These individuals are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability
in the ADA... . 136 Cong. Record H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990). Senator
Kennedy of Massachusetts, co-sponsor of the bill, agreed, 136 Cong. Rec. S9696
(daily ed. July 13, 1990), as did Representative Waxman..." Doe v. Kohn, Nast,
& Graf, No. CIV.A.93-4510, 1994 WL 454813, at *7 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1994).
See also H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (stating that the term "disability" includes "infection with
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus"). In addition, debate surrounding an
amendment applicable to food handlers concerned objections that the ADA
prevents restaurant owners from removing cooks infected with HIV. See
generally Webber, supra note 38, at 55-59.
124. See Webber, supra note 38, at 60 (citing House Labor Report at 52,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 334, for the proposition that Congress intended
that the ADA be "read in light of existing standards under the [RA]"). See also
Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage Co., Inc., No. 94 C 139, 1994 WL 440662, at *7
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In Kohn, the plaintiff argued that HIV infection is a "disabil-
ity" due to the substantial limitations the infection places on
reproduction. 126 The defendant, on the other hand, argued that
HIV infection did not qualify as a "disability" for "although [plain-
tiff] may have some dysfunction in an utterly unrelated area-a
dysfunction familiar to millions of Americans, who happen to be
sterile, but who nevertheless go about ably living their lives-to
hold that that medical problem makes the ADA applicable to him
would be to stretch the language and the purpose of the statute
beyond the breaking point." 127 Although finding the factual rec-
ord in the case thin with regard to."whether HIV status is a disor-
der or condition that affects the "reproductive" system," the court
concluded that HIV/AIDS is a "disability." The court opined:
[The court] deem[s] it significant that the Congress chose to use
the broad term "life"-"major life activities". That encompasses a
lot. Had the term "work- life", or "work" been used-"major work
activities", for example-it would, of course, suggest that the disa-
bility would only be deemed relevant in the on-the-job context.
Instead, the term "working" appears as just one example of the
various major activities embraced within the full scope of one's
life. It is clear, therefore, that the language of the statute does not
preclude procreating as a major life activity, but may well include
it. 12 8
With support in legislative history, litigation under the RA and
ADA, and the now corresponding case law, there is little doubt
that the ADA protects individuals with HIV and AIDS.
2. Defenses: Limits on the Scope of Prohibited Activity
The ADA provides several defenses which may provide protec-
tion to employers charged with discriminatory conduct:
a. Business Necessity
Generally, employers may not deny employment based solely
on the applicant's disability or employ a hiring criteria or test
which tends to "screen out" the disabled.129 But if the employer
n.3 (N.D. IIl. June 10, 1994) (stating that the RA was the precursor to the ADA
and 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (Supp. II 1990) requires consistency between the two).
125. No. CIV.A.93-4510, 1994 WL 454813 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1994).
126. Id. at *5.
127. Id. at *6.
128. Id. at *7.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (Supp. II 1990).
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can show that the hiring practice is "(1) job-related, (2) consistent
with business necessity, and (3) for a position which cannot be
performed by a disabled individual even with reasonable accom-
modation," the hiring practice may not result in liability. 130 For
example, as one writer notes, "a paid blood donor with HIV infec-
tion would be an individual with a disability who could not meet
the employer's qualification standards and whose disability could
not be accommodated. " 13 1
b. Direct Threat
The ADA only protects a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity" from discrimination. 132 A person is "qualified" simply if the
person can perform, with or without reasonable accommodation,
the essential functions of the position. The ADA, however, also
allows employers to "include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other indi-
viduals in the workplace."133 A "direct threat" defense is simply
the adoption of Arline's reasoning: disabled persons cannot be
excluded unless they pose "a significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommoda-
tion. Whether an employee poses a "significant risk" is deter-
mined by examining "(1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature
and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the
harm will occur, and (4) the imminence or immediacy of the poten-
tial harm."'35 This defense is applicable, for example, in a health
care setting. As one commentator argues, "[w]orkers who perform
exposure-prone medical procedures in which blood contact might
occur should generally stop performing such procedures if they are
infected." 36 And some courts agree.13 7
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
131. Webber, supra note 38, at 68.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1990).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
135. Robert B. Fitzpatrick & E. Anne Benaroya, Americans with Disabilities
Act and AIDS, C669 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 555, 578-79 (1991) (citing 29 C.F.R. Appendix
to § 1630.2(r)). See also Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
136. Mathiason & Berlin, supra note 15, at 742.
137. See Bradley, 3 F.3d at 924 (Surgical technologist was not "otherwise
qualified" due to the "cognizable risk of permanent duration with lethal
consequences."). See also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
136 [Vol. 17:115
22
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss1/6
AIDS & JOB DISCRIMINATION
c. Undue Hardship
As mentioned above, an employer must make reasonable
accommodations to disabled employees or job applicants, unless
the employer can show that any accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the business operation.'1 8  Nonetheless, if
accomodation would require "significant difficulty or expense," a
reasonable accommodation may not be necessary.' 3 9 Considera-
tion should be given to (1) the nature and cost of the accommoda-
tion, (2) the financial resources of the actual facility involved; the
number of persons employed at the facility; and the effect on
expenses and operation of the facility; (3) the employer's financial
resources; the number of employees; the "number, type, and loca-
tion of its facilities"; and (4) the nature of the employer's business
operations, "including the composition, structure, and functions of
the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, admin-
istrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in ques-
tion to the covered entity."140 For example, a solo practitioner
with a large caseload and very limited resources seeks an admin-
istrative assistant. Under such a fact pattern, it may be an undue
hardship to hire a person with "full blown" AIDS. Although some
job restructuring or decrease in working hours would likely be
reasonable in a larger practice, the solo practitioner may not have
the resources or the time to accomodate such a person.'41
d. Communicable Disease Exemption for Food Handling
Positions
The ADA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices to publish and update annually a list of all infectious and
communicable diseases which transmit through "handling the
food supply."142 If an employee has a disease included on the list,
and the risk cannot be eliminated by reasonable accomodation,
the employer "may refuse to assign or continue to assign such
individual to a job involving food handling."143 Although HIV
infection is not a listed disease, persons with HIV are at a height-
ened risk for secondary infections. If a secondary infection is on
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
141. Does this suggest that the larger employer should absorb most of the costs
of accommodation? See Fitzpatrick & Benaroya, supra note 135, at 579.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(2).
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the list, the exemption applies. Thus, the exemption indirectly
affects HIV-positive employees.'"
B. ADA as Compared with North Carolina's Response to HIVI
AIDS Discrimination
The ADA and North Carolina anti-discrimination law stem
from common orgins. The ADA and the NCHPPA both found dis-
crimination against a disabled person wrong because it excludes
individuals on the basis of an impairment inconsequential to a
position, thereby preventing the excluded person from realizing
their fullest potential.1 45 With the introduction of the AIDS epi-
demic, the need for protection from discrimination found a new
immediacy. Both Congress and the North Carolina legislature
found that people are less fearful of HIV testing by ensuring pro-
tection from discrimination if the test result is positive. 146 But, as
illustrated above, the results of federal and state action were polar
opposites. The ADA now cures several ills created by the North
Carolina legislature and courts.
1. Defining a Disability
Despite any defense a defendant might raise to exculpate any
alleged discriminatory behavior, clearly a person with HIV infec-
tion or AIDS in North Carolina now has a cause-of-action. Yet the
RA, the NCHPPA, and the ADA all define "disability" identi-
144. Webber, supra note 38, at 68.
145. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-2(b) (1987) ("[T]he practice of
discrimination on the basis of a handicapping condition threatens the rights and
proper privileges of the inhabitants of this State; and such discrimination results
in a failure to realize the productive capacity of individuals to their fullest
extent.") with 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1992) ("[Individuals with
disabilities ... have been faced with restrictions and limitations ... based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such
individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society....-).
146. "[W]e are fighting two fights - one against the HIV virus and one against
discrimination. We may not win the first until we have won the second." NORTH
CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE REsEARcH COMl'N REP. TO THE 1989 GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF NORTH CAROLINA, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, at 24 (1989),
reprinted in Hayes, supra note 32, at 1193. The "fear of potential discrimination
... will undermine our efforts to contain the HIV epidemic, and will leave HIV-
infected individuals isolated and alone." S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1989), reprinted in Gasarch, supra note 11, at 199, 209.
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cally. 1 4 7 Both North Carolina and federal courts agree that even
asymptomatic HIV infection constitutes a "physical impair-
ment."148 The difference lies in the statutory interpretation of
"major life activity." In Burgess, the North Carolina Supreme
Court concluded that because the General Assembly eliminated
"working" from the state act's adaptation of the RA's list of "major
life activities," the legislature intended to include only "essential
tasks one must perform on a regular basis in order to carry on a
normal existence."1 4 9 Neither working, having intimate relations,
nor having children constituted such "essential tasks."150
Perhaps the General Assembly wanted to exclude AIDS from
coverage under the state handicap act. As one author notes, the
"only apparent reason for the legislative deletion of 'working' from
the North Carolina act's definition of major life activities is to
expressly exclude coverage of impairments that do not affect basic
physical functions but do result in employment termination."15'
In Burgess, however, the court recognized that "[a] construction
which operates to defeat or impair the object of the statute must
be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the
legislative language."' 52 The NCHPPA was created to correct a
social injustice, an injustice which expressly included the denial of
work.' 53 As a remedial statute, courts should liberally construe
the NCHPPA.'54 Yet courts continually impaired the object of the
147. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1993) ("(1) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2)
a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(4) (1987) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(Supp. II 1990) (same).
148. See Burgess, 326 N.C. at 212, 388 S.E.2d at 138; Chalk, 840 F.2d at 704-
05; Kohn, 1994 WL 454813 at *7-8.
149. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 214, 388 S.E.2d at 139.
150. Id.
151. Hayes, supra note 32, at 1206-07.
152. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 215, 388 S.E.2d at 140 (citing State v. Hart, 287
N.C. 76, 80, 213 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1975)).
153. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-2(b) (1987) ("[The practice of discrimination
on the basis of a handicapping condition threatens the rights and proper
privileges of the inhabitants of this State; and such discrimination results in a
failure to realize the productive capacity of individuals to their fullest extent.").
It should be noted that in this author's opinion, not classifying work as a "major
life activity" is an- anomaly, particularly since the statute specifically
acknowledges that the denial of work is a deprivation of a citizen's rights.
154. In fact, plaintiff made this argument. See Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief
at 5, Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990)
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statute by construing the statute as protecting only those with
physical impairments which limit "essential tasks." The result
denies protection to not only those with asymptomatic HIV infec-
tion but to all impairments that limit a person's health or appear-
ance but do not necessarily leave a person unable to perform
"essential functions."1 5 5 This conclusion seems contrary to the
express purposes-of the NCHPPA. s' s The' court ignored a more
sensible conclusion to reach a result conforming to an inferred leg-
islative intent.
In contrast, the ADA ensures that such narrow limitations
will not be placed on the ability of disabled persons to state a
cause-of-action. The ADA's regulations advise that "the use of the
words 'such as' indicates that this list is illustrative and is not
intended to be exclusive."157 In addition, the ADA and federal
case law recognize the very real limitations diseases such as HIV
and AIDS place on reproductive freedom and socialization.'
2. Reasonable Accommodation
Essential to furthering a policy of reincorporating individuals
excluded from the mainstream of American life is realizing that
(No. 235PA89) (citing Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259
S.E.2d 248 (1979)).
155. For example, a person suffering of chronic heart disease whose employer,
fearing large expenses, fired him, and who is disabled under the ADA, because of
the person's "past history of heart disease, the permanent damage suffered to his
heart as a result, and the medical need to treat post-surgical arrhythmia on two
occasions." Finley v. Cowles Business Media, No. 93 CIV. 5051(PKL), 1994 WL
273336 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1994). Yet, under the Burgess reasoning, this person
arguably would have no cause-of-action. Although the person had a physical
impairment and was still under treatment, the condition does not limit his
"essential tasks," i.e., his ability to care for himself, to perform manual tasks, etc.
156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-2(a)-(b) (1987). Because "the practice of
discrimination based upon a handicapping condition is contrary to the public
interest and to the principles of freedom and equality of opportunity," the
"purpose of this Chapter is to encourage and enable all handicapped people to
participate fully to the maximum extent of their abilities in the social and
economic life of the State. . . ." Id.
157. EEOC Regulations, Appendix to Part 1630-Interpretative guidance on
Title I of the ADA, 29;C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1991), noted in Kohn, 1994 WL 454813
at *7.
158. See Kohn, 1994 WL 454813 at *7; Webber, supra note 38, at 60-61. See
also Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 (recognizing that an "impairment might not diminish
a person's physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially
limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to
the impairment").
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often inclusion requires recognition of diversity. The ADA
acknowledges that at times some accomodation is necessary to
ensure that disabled employees can "enjoy the same benefits and
privileges" of employment.15 9 But accomodation is not unlimited.
Unlike many affirmative action programs, reasonable accomoda-
tion always remains conditioned on whether the employee can
perform the "essential functions of the job."160 The employer also
may show that an accomodation would place an undue hardship
on the business. 16 1 In contrast, the NCCDA has no reasonable
accomodation standard. In fact, it authorizes an employer to reas-
sign or even fire an employee "if the employee is unable to perform
the normally assigned duties of the job."' 62 Following such statu-
tory language, an employer arguably can fire an employee with
HIV or AIDS who needs to readjust his work schedule around
medical treatment or complete work at home during a period of
illness. While the NCCDA does not ask the employer to change
the work environment at all, irrespective of the employee's ability
to perform the essentials of the position, the ADA seeks to change
the status quo without overburdening employers or guaranteeing
the disabled jobs without regard to qualification.
3. Fact versus Fear
From School Board of Nassau County v. Arline163 to today's
application of the ADA, federal legislation and case law demand
that any exclusion or limitation on employment of persons with
HIV or AIDS be based on "reasoned and medically sound judg-
ments," not fear alone.164 The policy behind the practice is simple:
while the dangers of transmission of an infectious disease are
sometimes very real, exclusion from the mainstream of American
life is often unwarranted and stigmatizing to its victims. North
Carolina's response to AIDS related job discrimination, however,
defeats any public health policy concerning HIV testing, and in
fact perpetuates the atmosphere of fear that plagued America dur-
ing the early years of the AIDS epidemic.
159. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1991).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. IV 1992). See generally Fitzpatrick &
Benaroya, supra note 135, at 570 (discussing reasonable accommodation versus
affirmative action).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
162. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i)(4) (1992).
163. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
164. Id. at 285.
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a. Medical Testing & Inquiry
The NCCDA primarily illustrates North Carolina's failure to
protect either victims of discrimination or public health. First, the
NCCDA actually encourages the exclusion of people with AIDS.
Overwhelming scientific evidence shows that HIV is not transmit-
ted through casual workplace conduct. 165 Although arguably
there is a heightened risk of transmission in the health care pro-
fession,16 6 the NCCDA allows required testing regardless of the
type of work or risks of exposure. 167 It essentially gives the
employer a license to deny employment. Second, the job applicant
is not encouraged to get tested, for a confirmed positive test then
becomes the basis for the denial of employment. Those reluctant
to get tested, mindful of the stigma associated with AIDS, avoid
those positions which require HIV testing and accept positions
which do not require testing. They remain untested and, if HIV-
positive, also untreated. Ignorance of the presence of HIV of
course then increases the chance that the infected individual will
transmit unknowingly the virus to someone else.
Finally, as one commentator notes, testing today is an imper-
fect science. On average, one person out of every hundred test
false-positive when they in fact do not carry HIV.' 68 Because the
popular ELISA test detects only the antibodies to HIV, a test may
give a false-negative during the period of time between the intro -
duction of HIV in the body and the body's production of detectable
antibodies when the person actually carries HIV. 16 9 Testing a
general working population generates unwarranted fear due to
false-positives while at the same time giving others a false sense
of security, and in the end serving "only to strengthen the forces of
irrationality, ignorance, and fear presently surrounding AIDS and
HIV-infection."170
With the enactment of the ADA, medically sound judgments
guide any limitations on employment. The ADA replaces the
atmosphere of "irrationality, ignorance, and fear" created by the
165. See Bullard, supra note 38, at 499-500.
166. See CDCP, supra note 14, at 19 (Forty health-care workers became
infected with HIV on the job.); Bradley, 3 F.3d at 924 (Surgical technologist was
not "otherwise qualified" due to the "cognizable risk of permanent duration with
lethal consequences.").
167. Hayes, supra note 32, at 1208.
168. Id. at 1209-10.
169. Id. at 1211.
170. Id. at 1211.
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NCCDA with an inquiry into the relationship between the disease
and the job position. Any inquiries concerning the existence of
HIV or AIDS must concern the ability of the applicant to "perform
job-related functions."' 71 The danger of general work population
tests is prevented by promoting private HIV/AIDS testing accom-
plished with knowledge that a positive result will not result in
unemployment or exclusion. The ADA takes testing out of the
pre-employment process unless out of business necessity. 172 Addi-
tionally, the ADA places strict limits on medical examinations and
inquiries. 173 These enactments protect the person with HIV or
AIDS from discrimination while also realizing that those afflicted
with a deadly virus cannot perform any job.
b. Communicable Disease Exemptions
In Burgess, the court performed "semantic gymnastics" to use
the communicable disease exemption as a factor denying plain-
tiff's cause-of-action. 7 4 Again, perhaps the General Assembly
wished to exclude AIDS from coverage under the state handicap
act using a communicable disease exemption.175 But this purpose
is not expressed. Clearly the legislature included the communica-
ble disease exemption to insure that one with a communicable dis-
ease that presents a threat of harm to a working environment
cannot endanger others simply because he has a "handicapped"
status. 1 76 Conversely, if the communicable disease would not dis-
qualify a non-handicapped person, that is, the disease would not
present a significant threat to the safety of others, the protection
of a "handicapped" status should still exist. HIV infection alone
should not disqualify a person from most employment; a HIV-posi-
171. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
173. See supra notes 148-52.
174. Borrowing expression from Hayes, supra note 32, at 1206.
175. Christyno L. Hayes notes that the protection from communicable disease
is already provided with the requirement that the disabled person be "qualified."
Hayes, supra note 32, at 1207. If the person represents a threat to the health or
safety of co-workers, the person would fail to be "qualified" under the Act. Id.
Therefore, the exemption was only intended to exclude AIDS discrimination. Id.
She also states at n. 94, that "t]his conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the
communicable disease exemption was added in 1987, at the height of public and
governmental ignorance and hysteria over the AIDS epidemic." Id.
176. For example, a visually-impaired individual may be terminated from his
position as cook if he is a carrier of Salmonella typhi, like "typhoid Mary." He
cannot risk the lives of others because it is discriminatory to fire a visually-
impaired person.
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tive employee can perform his usual duties with no threat of harm
to others. Assuming arguendo that the court considered one with
HIV infection a "handicapped person," is it not a discriminatory
action for an employer to fire one with HIV infection where the
disease alone would not disqualify a "non-handicapped" employee?
The court refused to see HIV infection both as a disease that
would not disqualify a person from normal working duties and a
disease that creates both the medical and social stigma deservant
of "handicapped" status.177 .
Under the ADA, there is no general communicable disease
exemption. But, as the result of political compromise, Congress
passed a "food handler" exemption. 1 7  Despite the politically-
charged atmosphere surrounding its creation, it retains the same
basic philosophy of action based on medical judgment. Exclusion
is allowed only if the individual suffers from a communicable dis-
ease listed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Under the North Carolina act, despite whether the General
Assembly intended to create the exemption to keep HIV/AIDS
unprotected or whether the supreme court played word games to
exclude HIV/AIDS, the result is the same. Individuals living with
HIV or AIDS are unprotected from discrimination regardless of
177. See School Bd. of Nausau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), wherein
Justice Brennan, addressing the applicability of tuberculosis as a "handicap"
under the 1973 Rehabilitation Act stated:
We do not agree... that, in defining a handicapped individual .. , (the
contagious effects of a disease can be meaningfully distinguished from
the disease's physical effects on a claimant .... [The] contagiousness
and her physical impairment each resulted from the same underlying
condition... : It would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the
distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the effects of a
disease on a patient and use that distinction to justify discriminatory
treatment.... [An impairment might not diminish a person's physical
or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that
person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to
the impairment.
Id. at 282.
178. Several members of Congress wanted a "food handler" exemption to
authorize the employers in the business of preparing or serving food to reassign
or fire "food handler" employees with HIV or AIDS. After the provision was
eliminated at conference, North Carolina's own Sen. Helms fought vigorously for
the provision's return, stating, "Scientists may make any contention they wish
.... Are scientists prepared to tell me that somebody with AIDS, or HIV, who is
bitter about the fact he is sick, if he purposely contaminates a salad that he is
making, will that not transmit the disease?" 136 CoNG. REc. S9527-02, S9542
(daily ed. July 11, 1990).
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the position. The ADA does not let fear of contagious disease con-
trol an employee's job security. Instead, medical knowledge
guides employment practice.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we observe the EEOC and Campbell University enter into
North Carolina's first AIDS related employment discrimination
case under the ADA, it is worth noting again the ADA's balance.
Although North Carolina citizens finally have a comprehensive
cause-of-action to fight this breed of discrimination, there still
exists difficult questions which may arise in this case. Does a
teacher's status as having "full blown" AIDS create a."significant"
risk of harm to his colleagues and students? Does his interaction
with students as a physical education teacher distinguish his case
from cases such as Chalk, where the teacher was a lecturer?179
Can Campbell show "undue hardship" because of its ultimate duty
to protect its students and the consequences of liability if trans-
mission occurs?18 0 Ironically, this case is the first in North Caro-
lina which has the potential to actually search for the answers.
As more and more people were diagnosed with HIV and AIDS,
federal and many state governments moved to curb discrimina-
tion. As shown, these policies developed for two primary purposes
(1) excluding those with HIV or AIDS because of ignorance,
hatred, or fear is wrong and not only perpetuates a false image of
many afflicted with the disease but unduly deprives the excluded
of opportunity; and (2) because of the social stigma attached with
AIDS, unless protection is offered, citizens will be fearful of HIV
testing, and in the process the disease will spread. While the fed-
eral government and many states under the RA led the fight
against such discrimination, North Carolina, while recognizing
these policies, ironically limited victims' rights in several ways
which effectively locked out most remedies, and more disturb-
ingly, promoted exclusion and the perpetuation of mythology.
Not until the passage of a national policy was this path
reversed. The ADA effectively recognizes (1) that HIV and AIDS
are disabilities which substantially limit reproductive freedom
and socialization; (2) that reincorporation of persons with HIV or
AIDS requires at times some accommodation because of our diver-
179. Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
180. For an interesting discussion of ADA issues which may arise in the
coming years, see generally Fitzpatrick & Benaroya, supra note 135.
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sity; and (3) that any exclusion or limitations on employment
must be based only on medically sound judgment and not fear.
Regardless of the outcome of the Campbell University case, an
injured plaintiff now has the ability to find justice.
Jeremy McKinney
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